Defining Agency and Its Scope (II) by DeMott, Deborah A.
 -1- 
Defining agency and its scope 
 
              
Deborah A. DeMott, Duke University* 
 
 
Forthcoming in Comparative Contract Law: A Tale of Two Legal Systems (Martin Hogg & 
Larry A. DiMatteo eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015)         
 
             
 
1    Introduction 
           
Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed that “to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins 
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does 
he owe as a fiduciary?”1 Much the same point can be made about the statement that a person is 
an agent. That a person acts as a principal’s agent does not mean that agency law—including the 
fiduciary duties it imposes—necessarily governs the entirety of the relationship between agent 
and principal. An agent may have rights defined by contract that the agent may exercise, distinct 
from the agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal, while, separately, the principal may consent to 
conduct by the agent that would otherwise breach the agent’s fiduciary duties. And the agent’s 
duties to the principal may be delimited by time, owing the principal lesser or no duties before 
the agency relationship begins and once it ends. More generally, whether any particular actor 
should be characterized as an agent in relationship to another person—the “principal” if the actor 
is an agent—is not always a straightforward question. If the parties’ relationship is one of agency 
                                                            
*I served as the Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement Third of Agency, 
published in final form in 2006. I presented drafts of earlier versions of this Chapter at the 38th 
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, in a public lecture at Queen’s University, 
and at the conference “Transatlantic Perspectives on Commercial Law.” Thanks to all who 
commented.   
1SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 US 80, 85-86 (1943). 
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within the common-law definition, the agent’s conduct affects the principal’s legal relations with 
third parties when the agent acts with actual or apparent authority. Additionally, at least portions 
of the agent’s relationship to the principal are fiduciary in character. This triggers specific 
requisites for effective consent by the principal to conduct that would otherwise breach the 
agent’s duties when the conduct is within the scope of the agency relationship and not excluded 
or sheltered from its demands by rights, distinct from the relationship, held by the agent.    
 As this Chapter demonstrates, whether a relationship amounts to one of common-law 
agency matters in many contexts, so widely so that the Chapter only samples recent cases from 
the United States that test the presence or absence of agency relationships. Albeit disparate in 
context and stakes, the cases illustrate the broad applicability of the common-law definition. It is 
well-established that an agency relationship is “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on 
the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”2 The fiduciary character of the relationship is constitutive of 
agency; that is, if in a particular relationship an actor owes no duty of loyalty to anyone, the law 
in the United States is clear that the relationship, whatever it may be, is not one of agency. 
Likewise constitutive are the principal’s power or right to control the agent and the agent’s 
capacity to affect the principal’s legal relations with third parties.  
 By characterizing an agent as person who “acts on behalf of” a principal, agency law 
positions the agent as the principal’s representative for purposes of legally-salient interactions 
with third parties and facts about the world. An agent serves as an extension of the principal, and 
not, as is true of some fiduciaries, a substitute charged to act in the best interests of the  
                                                            
2 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01. 
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beneficiary of the relationship.3 Thus, the principal’s continuing existence is requisite to an 
ongoing agency relationship.4 A principal has an ongoing power or right of control over the 
agent, with the capacity to furnish interim instructions to the agent; the agent’s duty is to 
interpret instructions received from the principal faithfully, as the agent reasonably understands 
the principal would wish at the time the agent determines how to act.5 And an agent’s conduct 
directly affects the principal’s legal relations with third parties when the agent acts with actual or 
apparent authority. Thus, the agent’s role does not so much substitute for the principal as it 
elongates the principal externally, a characterization grounded in the principal’s continuing 
powers of control; the direct impact the agent’s actions carry for the principal; and the agent’s 
duty to interpret instructions received from the principal in light of the principal’s present 
wishes.6     
 Despite their theoretical and practical significance, the lines of demarcation between an 
                                                            
3This point and its implications are elaborated at length in Deborah A DeMott, ‘The Fiduciary 
Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions’ in Andrew S Gold & Paul B Miller 
(eds) Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (OUP 2014) hereinafter DeMott, ‘Fiduciary 
Character’). 
4 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.07 (2) (death of individual principal terminates agent’s 
actual authority, effective when agent or third party has notice of principal’s death); § 3.07 (4) 
(cessation of existence of principal that is not an individual, or commencement of process that 
will lead to cessation, terminates agent’s actual authority in absence of law providing otherwise). 
Apparent authority terminates when it is no longer reasonable for the third party with whom the 
agent deals to believe that the agent continues to act with actual authority. Id § 3.11. 
5 Kent Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation (OUP 2010) 220-7; DeMott, ‘Fiduciary Character’ (n 3) 
322. 
6Of course, an agent may occupy an additional fiduciary role, such as trusteeship, that requires 
service as a substitute. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(10)(defining “trustee” as “a holder 
of property who is subject to fiduciary duties to deal with the property for the benefit of charity 
or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee” and “agent-trustee” as “a 
trustee subject to the control of the settlor or one or more beneficiaries”). 
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agent’s fiduciary duties and the larger set of rights and duties between agent and principal are 
relatively unexplored. Depending on the compass of an agent’s fiduciary duties, the agent may or 
may not be privileged to take actions that impair the principal’s interests. If such an action falls 
within the scope of the agent’s fiduciary duties, it breaches the agent’s duty unless the principal 
consents to it. To be effective, the principal’s consent must be focused on either a specific act or 
a type of act that may reasonably be expected to occur.7 The consent’s effectiveness also requires 
that the agent deal fairly and in good faith with the principal and disclose to the principal all 
material facts that the agent knows or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s 
judgment.8 Thus, in obtaining consent, the agent acts subject to constraints that are themselves 
the consequence of the agent’s fiduciary position. But such constraints are inapplicable when the 
agent’s act is outside the scope of the agency, that is, when the act is distinct from the actions 
that the agent has undertaken to perform as the principal’s representative.    
 The larger theoretical stakes are significant. These issues and the cases in which they 
surface furnish intriguing applications for the terminology, concepts, and analysis developed by 
recent scholarship concerning the nature of legal rules and the relative ease with which parties to 
a given transaction or relationship may alter them. An agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal are 
often characterized as default rules, set at the categorical level and imposed by the law when a 
particular relationship falls within the category of “agency.”9 Thus, the content of an agent’s 
                                                            
7 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06(1)(2006) 
8Id. 
9Mariana Pargendler, ‘Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties Reconsidered’ 
(2008) 82 Tul L Rev 1315, 1344. Although beyond the scope of this paper, fiduciary duties are 
best understood as imposed by the law although the parties’ relationship is consensual. Scholars 
are divided on this question of categorization, which is the subject of an extensive literature.  
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fiduciary duties does not represent a “tailored” approximation of the terms for which a particular 
principal and agent might have contracted.10 Legal theorists characterize fiduciary duties as 
instances of “sticky” default rules, ones that are more difficult to alter.11 The legal standard by 
which they may be abrogated or varied is set at a higher level than is the case for other default 
rules.12 Prior scholarship does not, however, address issues that arise when the question is 
demarcating the boundary between an agent’s fiduciary duties and other rights and duties as 
between agent and principal.  
This Chapter identifies two distinct determinations: (1) the scope of the role in which an 
agent’s actions will carry legal consequences for the principal; and (2) consent by the principal to 
action by the agent within that scope that would otherwise breach the agent’s fiduciary duties. 
This distinction eludes simple contractualist accounts of agency and fiduciary obligation more 
generally. The legal doctrines that underlie these distinctions are instances of “altering rules,” 
that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions to vary a default rule.13 The scope of an agent’s 
role or undertaking is established by agreement between agent and principal. A legally-effective 
agreement may encompass a range of possible outcomes that are not fully specified and may be 
legally effective although one party does not disclose material information to the other.14 
                                                            
10Id at 1320. On “tailored” versus “untailored” rules that fill out terms in parties’ contracts, see 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale L J 87, 91-92.  
11See Brett McDonnell, ‘Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law’ (2007) 60 SMUL 
Rev 383, 384. 
12See Pargendler (n 9) 1343. 
13For the “altering rule” terminology, see Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 3.  
14See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3 (1981)(defining “agreement” as “a manifestation of 
mutual assent on the part of two or more persons” and a “bargain” as “an agreement to exchange 
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However, a principal’s consent to conduct that would otherwise breach a fiduciary duty requires 
specificity. It is comparable to a victim’s consent to an actor’s commission of an intentional tort, 
which is not effective unless it represents “willingness in fact” that the tortious conduct occur.15 
At least for the United States, the salience of a tort-law standard is unsurprising because breach 
of fiduciary duty is conventionally defined to be tortious conduct.16  
 Moreover, “consent” in this sense is significantly different from the more diffuse term, 
“consensual,” as well as from the operation of consent in transactional applications of agency 
law. Agency is a species of consensual relationship, one not mandated by the law, comparable in 
this respect to many other relationships that persons may choose to have with each other.17 But  
consenting to have such a relationship is not equivalent to manifesting willingness in fact to be 
affected by all acts that may be committed by the other party to the relationship. Separately, in 
the transactional realm, an agent’s ability to create contractual liability that binds the principal to 
a third party with whom the agent interacted is often grounded in the principal’s consent, via 
either a conferral of actual authority on the agent or the appearance of authority on which a third 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances”). The fact 
that terms are missing from an agreement or are left for later agreement does not defeat 
formation of a contract if “the actions of the parties...show conclusively they intended to 
conclude a binding agreement” and the court is able “to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to 
the bargain.” Id. § 33, cmt. a.  
15 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892(2) (1979). 
16Id § 874. For further discussion of section 874 and the implications of treating breach of 
fiduciary duty as a tort, see Deborah A. DeMott, ‘Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable 
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences’ (2006) 48 Ariz L Rev 925.  
17Marriage, contracts, and bailments are other examples of legally-distinct relationships that are 
consensual. 
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party relies.18 Although the principal’s “consent” can fairly be characterized as “the core of any 
normative account” of the transactional dimensions of agency doctrine,19 it operates not as 
transaction-by-transaction consent, but as an advance expression of the principal’s will (or what 
reasonably so appears to the third party) that thereafter “exists in the background during the 
agent’s negotiations” with a third party.20 Once manifested, such consent continues to lurk, 
sufficing later to bind the principal to transactions within its scope albeit the principal would then 
prefer not to be bound. As the Chapter demonstrates, consent in the agency context may be 
defined to require more or less specificity so that definitions differ markedly in the level of 
generality at which they operate.  
 Legal taxonomy aside, requiring particularized (and not “lurking”) consent from a 
principal to conduct that would otherwise contravene the agent’s fiduciary duties is consistent 
with the stickiness of fiduciary duty as a legally-imposed and categorical default. Loyalty to a 
principal’s interests when action is taken on the principal’s behalf is likely to correspond to the 
expectation of most principals, while a principal’s vulnerability to disloyal action by an agent is 
an underlying justification for the imposition of fiduciary duty on the agent.21 The requirement of 
particularized consent also recognizes that from a principal’s standpoint, an agent’s disloyalty 
                                                            
18See Gerard McMeel, ‘Philosophical foundations of the law of agency’ (2000) 116 LQR 387, 
389.  
19Id at 410. 
20See Danny Busch & Laura Macgregor, ‘Introduction’ in Danny Busch & Laura Macgregor 
(eds),  The Unauthorised Agent 1, 2 (OUP 2009). 
21For these points in the corporate-law context, see McDonnell (n 11) 414-16. On the principal’s 
vulnerability to the agent, see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01, cmt b (noting “the 
vulnerability that any relationship of agency creates by exposing the principal’s property or 
interests more generally to the risk of self-interested action by the agent”). 
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betrays the principal’s interests and is not simply an occasion for disappointment, comparable to 
a generic breach of contract. Relatedly, the principal’s entitlement to loyalty from the agent 
operates independently of whether the agent has fulfilled other duties owed to the principal, 
including those defined by contract between principal and agent.22 
 The remainder of this Chapter applies these general points to concrete examples. Section 
2 opens with recent cases that illustrate how courts in the United States apply the common-law 
definition of agency and how cases applying agency law treat the parties’ own statements about 
the nature of their relationship. Section 3 focuses on the scope of an agent’s role, prefaced by the 
basic point that contractual attempts to limit an agent’s authority or the legal consequences of the 
agent’s conduct for the principal are not binding on third parties who are unaware of such 
limitations. Section 3 then examines settled examples of actions that an agent may take that are 
acknowledged to fall outside the scope of an agency role and thus beyond the boundary of the 
agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal. The section next examines recent cases that turn on 
delineating the scope of an agent’s role and duties in the context of auctions for art objects. Of 
intrinsic interest, these cases are valuable more generally because the application of standard 
agency-law doctrine in this setting is less well established than in many others. Art markets (like 
the residential real estate context that features in Section 4) are distinctive in many ways, 
including extensive and customary use of non-employee intermediaries. Section 4 focuses on 
instances of a principal’s consent (or purported consent) to action by an agent that would 
otherwise breach the agent’s fiduciary duties, including several illustrations involving 
transactions in residential real estate. Section 4 also examines, more briefly, end-of-relationship 
                                                            
22See Rebecca Lee, ‘In Search of the Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty: Some 
Observations on Conaglen’s Analysis’ (2007) 27 Oxford J Leg Stud 327, 332. 
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agreements in which a principal consents to release claims against an agent. Section 5 contrasts 
the legally operative consequences of “consent” with “agreement” and argues that these 
consequences parallel other aspects of basic agency-law doctrine. 
2  Defining agency 
The elements of the standard definition of common-law agency are constitutive of an agency 
relationship with the consequence that the absence of any element from a particular relationship 
means that it is not an agency relationship. The standard definition characterizes a relationship 
between two persons as one of agency only when one person or actor is a fiduciary, acts subject 
to the control of the other person, and acts as that person’s representative (or on the person’s 
behalf).23 Applying the standard definition is often unproblematic, at least in part because the 
functions served by some agents are so settled that characterizing the relationship seems obvious. 
It may thus be surprising that outcomes in significant cases continue to turn on contested 
applications of the basic definition; but given the variety of relationships to which the definition 
of agency may potentially apply, perhaps the persistence of definitional disputes is unsurprising.  
2.1   Definitional elements applied 
For starters, in the public-law context, in Hollingsworth v. Perry the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that proponents of a California ballot initiative amending the state’s 
constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry did not have standing to appeal 
an order from a federal district court finding the initiative unconstitutional (under the federal 
constitution) after the state’s elected officials declined to defend the amendment.24 Standing for 
federal-court purposes is limited to parties who have suffered a concrete and particularized 
                                                            
23See text accompanying n 2. 
24133 S Ct 2652 (2013). 
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injury, which the Court held was not true of the proponents, who had no personal stake in the 
initiative once the voters approved it.25 Although the proponents characterized themselves as 
agents of the state, they were not, in the Court’s assessment; the proponents neither held official 
designations or appointments authorizing them to defend the state’s interests, nor were they 
agents of the state’s people because “the most basic features of an agency relationship are 
missing here.”26 The proponents “answer to no one; they decide for themselves, with no review, 
what arguments to make and how to make them.”27 Thus, the proponents lacked a principal in 
the agency-law sense with rights or powers of control, whether exercised through an initial 
statement of authority or through interim instructions. Moreover, the proponents “owe nothing of 
the sort” resembling a fiduciary obligation to the people of the state;28 their litigation strategy as 
a consequence was not bounded by “the need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes 
in public opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”29 Thus, the absence of two 
constitutive elements of common-law agency established that the proponents lacked standing.30   
 Away from the high stakes of constitutional litigation, the constitutive quality of the 
common-law definition of agency shapes judicial decisions across the board. One recent 
                                                            
25133 S Ct at 2663. 
26133 S Ct at 2666.  
27133 S Ct at 2667. 
28Id. 
29Id.  
30Beyond the scope of this Chapter are whether the Court’s construction of standing doctrine is 
justifiable and whether the voter-initiative process in California and twenty-six other states 
warrants a test for proponents’ standing that departs from the requisites of common-law agency. 
See 133 S Ct 2675 (arguing that majority “fails to grasp or accept ... the basic premise of the 
initiative process...”)(Kennedy, J dissenting). 
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transactional example stems from the world of online sales of travel accommodations. In 
Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., the defendant was an online vendor that used, among its business 
models, a service termed “Name Your Own Price” that invited consumers to “‘bid’” for hotel 
rooms.31 Users of this service did not designate a particular hotel but instead indicated the dates 
for which they needed accommodations and the neighborhood or geographic area they desired, 
plus the minimum “‘star’” quality they deemed acceptable. Users then placed bids at the 
minimum price they were willing to pay; after searching its online inventory (which was 
proprietary) Priceline notified the user whether a bid had been accepted and, if so, the hotel for 
which a reservation had been booked. However, Priceline did not disclose to its users that it 
would not accept a bid unless its inventory enabled it to satisfy the bid at a rate lower than the 
bid price, with the differential retained by Priceline as profit in addition to its stated (and 
disclosed) service fee.  
 The plaintiffs in Johnson argued that Priceline represented itself as a travel agent and, as 
their agent, breached its fiduciary duty to them by retaining the bid-rate differential without 
disclosing this practice to them. Of course, an agent commits a garden-variety breach of 
fiduciary duty by acquiring a material benefit in connection with a transaction conducted on the 
principal’s behalf without the principal’s consent.32 Examining these facts against the elements 
of the common-law definition of agency, the court held that Priceline was not an agent of users 
of its “Name Your Own Price” service and thus did not owe them an agent’s fiduciary duty. In 
the court’s analysis, it was fatal to the plaintiff’s agency claim that, once a customer submitted a 
                                                            
31711 F 3d 271 (2d Cir 2013). 
32 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.02. Section 4 discusses distinctions between disclosure to a 
principal and effective consent by the principal.  
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bid, the customer thereafter “retained no authority over the manner in—or the price for—which 
the reservation will be procured,” thereby depriving the customer of any “right of interim 
control...”33 Johnson relies on the well-established difference between a principal’s interim 
control over an agent and “‘delimit[ing] the choices that [a] service provider has the right to 
make,”34 which does not constitute “control” for agency-law purposes. Additionally, and more 
factually contingent, the court highlights the practical fact that “there is no ‘interim’” in Name 
Your Own Price transactions, which are effected in “nearly instantaneous” manner, comparable 
to a non-online intermediary “rifling through” its inventory to locate conforming goods that a 
customer has stated a willingness to buy at a specified price.35 
2.2   The parties’ own characterization 
How two parties characterize their own relationship raises separate questions. As noted above, 
agency is a consensual relationship grounded in a manifestation of assent from the principal and 
the agent’s counterpart manifestation of assent or consent. But courts in most if not all 
jurisdictions in the United States would likely also agree with the Restatement (Third) 
proposition that “[w]hether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement between 
parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not controlling.”36 The parties’ own 
characterization of their relationship—as agency or not-agency—may be relevant at least as an 
evidential matter to a court’s determination but is not dispositive.  
                                                            
33711 F3d at 278. 
34Id at 6, quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, cmt f. 
35Id. Alternatively, the court analogizes “Name Your Own Price” customers to bidders at a 
conventional auction. In a limited way an auctioneer may become an agent of a bidder as well as 
the consignor, see section 3.2.  
36Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02. 
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 However, even when the assertion of an agency relationship is made by a third party, 
some jurisdictions focus on determining the principal’s will or intention and accord weight to 
disclaimers of agency. In New Millennium Consulting, Inc. v. United Healthcare Services, Inc., a 
federal court assessed the significance under state (Minnesota) law of a disclaimer of agency 
status in a dispute between a supplier of contingent labor and a centralized management 
company that assisted its customers in procuring and managing contingent workers in 
information-technology fields.37 Following the management company’s insolvency, the labor 
supplier sued one of the management company’s customers to recover outstanding amounts due. 
The standardized agreement between the customer and the management company stated that the 
parties “‘intend to create an independent contractor relationship and nothing contained in this 
agreement shall be construed to make either Customer or [management company] ... principals, 
agents, or employees of the other ....” The agreement also provided that the management 
company would be solely responsible for paying suppliers, but only once it received payment 
from the customer.38  
 To be sure, the court might have read the non-intention language narrowly, as 
disclaiming only potential constructions of the agreement itself, as opposed a broader reading 
encompassing the court’s application of the law to its factual determinations. Instead, the court 
embraced the challenge presented by Minnesota precedents, which “focus[] on the will of the 
principal in determining agency,” even in cases involving third-party claims. Minnesota cases 
treat language like that in New Millennium as effective to show that the purported principal did 
                                                            
37695 F3d 854 (8th Cir 2012). 
38695 F3d at 856. 
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not consent to a relationship of agency.39 Arguably mitigating or vitiating its emphasis on the 
import of written indicia of the principal’s will, the Eighth Circuit observed that the plaintiffs did 
not claim that the management company had apparent authority to act on behalf of the customer, 
that is, that they reasonably understood manifestations of the customer to mean that the 
management company acted as the customer’s agent in dealings with the plaintiffs.40 
Additionally, the court noted that the customer and the management company “never disguised 
anything about their relationship...and the [labor] suppliers knew exactly who they were 
contracting with;”41 and on its facts the relationship between the customer and the management 
company lacked indicia of agency, in particular because the customer asserted no control over 
the management company.42 Thus, although the New Millennium court duly cited applicable 
state-law doctrine stressing the principal’s will as determinative of the existence of an agency 
relationship, the court’s qualifications and cautions imply an overall stance not so different in 
substance from other jurisdictions.                
3  The scope of an agency relationship 
One challenge for consensual accounts of agency is the question: “consent to what?” Parties’ 
ability to define the scope of an agency relationship reflects consensual understandings of the 
relationship’s boundaries relative to agency law. However, parties within the confines of an 
agency relationship lack the power, through contractual disclaimers or internal agreements, to 
reshape agency’s legal consequences that stem from the agent’s dealings with third parties. This 
                                                            
39695 F.3d at 859, citing Mikulay v. Home Indem Co, 449 NW2d 464, 467 (Minn Ct App 1989). 
40See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.03. 
41695 F3d at 859. 
42695 F3d at 859-60. 
 -15- 
limitation underlies the robust doctrine of apparent authority, mentioned above, because it 
disallows restrictions on an agent’s authority from undercutting the reasonable beliefs of third 
parties who deal with the agent on the basis of the principal’s manifestations of the extent or 
even the existence of the agent’s authority, when those restrictions are unknown to the third 
party. This basic point about the reach of agency doctrine also underlies the principal’s liability 
when the agent does business in a manner consistent with customary industry practice using 
means that the principal claims not to have authorized, when the agent reasonably believes the 
principal nonetheless wishes the agent to follow customary practice.43 And, when the customary 
practice happens to be illegal, the principal’s internal restrictions on the agent’s authority do not 
necessarily defeat the principal’s liability.44 
3.1  Inclusions and exclusions from scope of relationship 
In contrast, as between themselves, the parties to an agency relationship may define its scope 
through inclusion and exclusion. In many standard instances of agency relationships, an agent 
has rights that the agent may exercise, distinct from the agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal, 
although by exercising the right the agent impairs the principal’s interests. Thus, an agent may 
have the right to assert a lien over property of the principal to assure payment of agreed-to 
compensation for the agent’s services.45 A securities broker who lends funds to a client to 
                                                            
43Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 cmt f. 
44See Chicago Title Ins Co v. Washington Office of Ins Comm’r, 309 P3d 372 (Wash 2013)(large 
title insurer, having authorized local title company to solicit business on its behalf, also impliedly 
authorized it to do acts necessary and customary toward larger objective of landing business for 
title insurer; local title company, contrary to statutory and administrative prohibitions but 
consistently with pervasive industry practice, made many gifts to real-estate middlemen, binding 
title company despite language in agreement limiting authority to acts expressly designated 
therein). 
45See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01, cmt c. 
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complete transactions through a margin account becomes the client’s creditor and holds 
securities in the account as a pledgee; in acting as a lender to its principal, the client, the broker 
is not acting as an agent.46 If a broker liquidates a margin account as permitted by the account 
agreement when the account becomes under-margined, the broker’s action may be deleterious to 
the client but lies beyond the scope of any fiduciary duty the broker owes the client as its 
principal.47  
 An agent may also exercise contractually-conferred rights that cut even closer to its 
agency relationship with the principal. In Palm Bay International, Inc. v. Marchesi de Barolo, 
S.P.A., an Italian wine producer entered into an agreement with two individuals, appointing them 
its exclusive sales agents in the United States.48 The individuals’ obligation under the agreement 
was to select importers, distributors, and wholesalers; they appointed a company (Palm Bay) of 
which they were the sole owners, which entered into a contract for the exclusive right to import 
the producer’s wine into the United States. Disputes arose when wine sold by Palm Bay to a 
restaurant chain proved defective and the agents directed Palm Bay to set off amounts it owed 
the producer against monies it had paid the restaurant chain for the bad wine. The court held that 
the setoff, to which the principal protested, did not breach the agents’ fiduciary duty to the 
principal because the scope of their agency encompassed only the appointment of the importer, 
Palm Bay, not their instruction to it directing the set-off.49 Put differently, the agreement under 
which the producer appointed its individual agents was separate from Palm Bay’s contract with it 
                                                            
46See, e.g., Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P2d 658 (Ariz 1966). 
47See, e.g., First Am Disc Corp v. Jacobs, 756 NE2d 273, 281-82 (Ill App Ct 2001). 
48Palm Bay Int’l, Inc v. Marchesi de Barolo SPA, 796 F Supp 2d 396 (SDNY 2011). 
49Id. at * 9.  
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as importer, not a component of one integrated agreement all within a fiduciary ambit.50     
3.2  Art auctions and agency relationships      
Auctions of art objects illustrate both the operation of agency doctrine and the efficacy of 
parties’ limits on the scope of agency relationships. An owner of a work of art who consigns it 
for sale to an auction house becomes a principal in a relationship in which the auction house acts 
as the consignor’s agent. Conventionally the terms of their relationship are set forth in a written 
consignment agreement, which provides that the auction house will offer the consigned property 
for sale at auction. A consignment agreement is often made subject to the terms of the auction 
house’s standard contracts with purchasers, which are its conditions of sale and its limited 
warranty or guarantee agreement. If the consignor sets a reserve price—the confidential 
minimum price the consignor will accept—the auctioneer may “bid up” to that amount by 
placing bids on the consignor’s behalf.51 Auction-house contracts also recognize that the auction 
house may accept bids in advance (“order bids”) on behalf of absentee bidders and place them on 
the absentee bidders’ behalf.52 In a limited way, this practice situates the auction house in a 
classic (if limited) position of dual agency, through which it represents both its consignor and the 
absentee bidder on whose behalf it places an order bid.53 A skillful auctioneer holding an order 
                                                            
50On setoff generally, see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.06. Typical setoff disputes involve 
amounts that the agent owes the third party or the third party owes the agent, and that the third 
party and the principal owe each other. In Palm Bay, the amounts setoff were owed by the 
importer to the principal but the importer, as a third party for purposes of agency doctrine, was 
controlled by the agent; no amounts owed to or by the agents were involved.  
51See John H. Merryman et al, Law, Ethics & the Visual Arts (5th edn Kluwer Law Intl 2007) 
1028 (Sotheby’s Conditions of Sale and Terms of Guarantee (2001)). 
52Id. at 1004-05. 
53The court’s analysis in Johnson did not acknowledge this possibility. See 2013 WL 1223326 at 
* 7 (stating that Priceline’s customers who bid in “Name Your Own Price” system “do not 
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bid, aware of the fiduciary problem, would calculate in advance the price at which to open 
bidding plus the amount of subsequent bid increments, so that the amount of the order bid is 
reached “in the book” and not by a bidder in the auction room. Otherwise, the auctioneer has not 
discharged the house’s duty to the absentee bidder because bidding in the room has outpaced the 
order bid. Of course, a bidder in the room could then outbid the absentee bidder at the next 
higher price interval.55    
 The ensemble of agreements linking consignor, auction house, and successful bidder may 
expressly permit action by the auction house that is either injurious to the consignor or 
inconsistent with the consignor’s express wishes. Consider first Reale v. Sotheby’s, Inc, in which 
a collector consigned his coin collection for sale by auction.56 To estimate prices at which the 
coins might sell, the auction house consulted with a coin expert toward whom the consignor held 
an intense personal antipathy. Although the consignor claimed to have told the auction house to 
have no involvement with this particular expert for his sale, the court held that the auction house 
had no duty to disclose the consultation to the consignor, its principal. The consignment 
agreement gave the auction house “complete discretion as to ... consulting with any expert,” with 
the consequence that the auction house had no duty either to follow its principal’s instructions or 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
suggest that an auctioneer ... has a fiduciary duty to prospective buyers to mitigate their 
overbidding”). In general, an auction house acts as an agent only on behalf of consignors, not 
bidders or purchasers at auction. See Sotheby’s, Inc. v. Minor, 2009 WL 3444887 at * 9 (SDNY 
Oct 26, 2009). And in general an agent breaches its fiduciary duty to its principal “by acting by 
or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency relationship.” 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.03.  
55For a specific example, see Peter Watson, From Manet to Manhattan (Random House 1992) 
22. 
56718 NYS2d 37 (App. Div. 2000). 
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to disclose the fact of its noncompliance with them.57 Thus, the consignment agreement in Reale 
had the consequence of relieving the auction house of duties of performance that an agent 
conventionally owes a principal.58   
 The same ensemble of agreements may also place actions by the auction house outside 
the boundary of duties that an agent otherwise owes a principal when its actions would breach an 
agent’s duties of loyalty,59 as opposed to the duties of performance implicated by Reale. In three 
relatively recent cases, disputes over an object’s authenticity illustrate tensions between an 
auction house’s fiduciary position as the consignor’s agent and its rights defined by contract. In 
all, the court’s analysis turns on whether the ensemble of consignment and sale agreements 
placed the auction house’s action outside the scope of its role as consignor’s agent.  
 Situated outside that scope, an auction house’s contractual rights may extend to conduct 
not specified in the consignment agreement and likely not foreseen by most consignors. In 
Kohler v. Leslie Hindman, Inc., owners of a painting purportedly by Theodore Rousseau 
consigned it for sale to an auction house under an agreement that obliged the auction house to 
sell the painting according to the conditions of sale detailed in the auction catalog.60 These 
included a provision that neither the consignors nor the auction house made any warranties of 
authority and that the painting was sold AS IS, although the catalog also stated that in the best 
                                                            
57Id at 38. 
58See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 (agent’s duty to comply with all lawful instructions 
received from principal) and § 8.11 (agent’s duty to use reasonable effort to provide facts to the 
principal when agent has reason to know principal would wish to have them).  
59Restatement (Third) of Agency, like Restatement (Second) of Agency, differentiates duties of 
loyalty from those termed duties of “performance” in Restatement (Third) and “service and 
obedience” in Restatement (Second).   
6080 F3d 1181 (7th Cir 1996). 
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judgment of the auction house, the painting was a Rousseau. After a collector’s agent viewed the 
painting at a pre-auction showing, the agent expressed doubts about the attribution to an 
auction-house employee. Unable to obtain an authoritative opinion before the auction, the 
collector agreed with auction-house owner that, if he prevailed in the bidding, he could return the 
painting if an expert later determined it not to be work of Rousseau. The auction house did not 
disclose this agreement to its consignor; the collector, who made the highest bid at auction, later 
returned the painting following an expert’s assessment that hands other than Rousseau’s had 
painted it.  
 By making the side agreement with the collector, the auction house arguably took action 
beyond the scope of its authority that adversely affected its principal’s interests. Moreover, 
having failed to disclose the fact of the side agreement to its consignor, the auction house 
arguably withheld material information from its principal; had the consignor known about the 
side agreement when the auction house reached agreement with the collector, the consignor 
might have terminated the consignment agreement. By doing so, it would have avoided the taint 
thereafter associated with the painting. However, an additional provision in the consignment 
agreement distanced the auction house’s actions from the scope of its duties as an agent. The 
agreement stated that the auction house had “authority as your agent to accept the return and 
rescind the sale of any property if we at any time in our sole discretion determine that the 
offering for sale of any property has subjected us and/or you to any liability under a warranty of 
authenticity.”61 In the court’s analysis, if the auction house had sole discretion to determine to 
rescind a sale, it impliedly had discretion to make a conditional promise to rescind. Only the 
contractual duty of good faith, as measured by the consignee’s subjective judgment would 
                                                            
6180 F3d at 1184. 
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constrain its exercise of discretion, not an overarching duty of loyalty to its consignor’s interests. 
Nor was the auction house under a duty to disclose the conditional rescission agreement to the 
consignor.  
 Likewise, in Mickle v. Christie’s, Inc., an auction house rescinded the sale of an unsigned 
painting attributed by both its owners and the auction catalog to Carl Wimar.62 The successful 
bidder at auction refused to pay for the painting and requested rescission, allegedly on the basis 
of doubts circulating in the trade about the Wimar attribution. The auction house resisted but, 
consistent with the conditions of sale, agreed that the buyer would obtain the opinions of two 
experts and that the sale would be rescinded if both agreed the painting was not by Wimar. The 
auction house rescinded the sale after the expert who originally authenticated the painting 
expressed a lack of confidence and another expert, agreed to by the buyer, opined that the 
painting was not Wimar’s work. The consignors challenged the auction house’s rescission as 
inconsistent with an agent’s duty of “undivided loyalty” to its principal. 
 In the court’s analysis, the auction house’s fiduciary duties extended only to “‘matters 
within the scope of [its] agency,’”63 and that scope itself “may be defined or modified by 
agreement between the principal and agent.”64 The consignment agreement provided that the 
auction house had no obligation to enforce payment by the buyer and that, in the event of 
non-payment, in its “sole discretion” the auction house may cancel the sale and return the 
                                                            
62207 F Supp 2d 237 (SDNY 2002). Carl Wimar was a nineteenth century American painter of 
note. Id at 239.  
63Id. at 245, quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13 (1958). Comment a to section 13 
states that “[t]he agreement to act on behalf of the principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary, 
that is, a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of 
another in matters connected with his undertaking.”  
64Id at 245. 
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property to its consignor. The agreement, like the agreement in Kohler, also authorized the 
auction house to rescind the sale and accept the return of the property “‘at any time if [auction 
house] in our sole discretion determines that the offering for sale of any Property has subjected 
or may subject [auction house] and/or Consignor to any liability ....’”65 Thus, although in 
rescinding the auction house acted in its own interests and arguably at odds with those of the 
consignors, the consignment agreement placed its right to do so outside the scope of its agency 
and its fiduciary obligation to the consignors.    
   The same analysis insulates an auction house’s exercise of contractual discretion 
although a successful bidder at auction, who seeks to rescind a completed purchase, arguably is 
motivated as much by simple buyer’s regret as by concerns about the authenticity of the object 
purchased. In Greenwood v. Koven, the bidder who prevailed at auction with a bid for a pastel 
purportedly by Georges Braque expressed doubts about its authenticity after paying for it and 
demanded rescission.66 Perhaps coincidentally, her demand for rescission followed a sudden and 
drastic decline art markets after a long period of rising prices.67 The auction house independently 
sought the opinion of an expert, who refused to confirm the pastel’s authenticity. Like the Mickle 
court, the Greenwood court held that any duty the auction house had to refrain from action that 
would impair its consignor’s interests was modified by the provision in the consignment 
agreement that gave it sole discretion, including discretion to consult experts. 
3.3  Broader theoretical implications  
These art-auction cases have implications for the theoretical treatment of fiduciary duties as 
                                                            
65Id at 239-40. 
66880 F Supp 186 (SDNY 1995).  
67See Merryman et al (n 25) 1036. 
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default rules. The fiduciary duty of loyalty has been characterized as a “sticky” default, one 
difficult for the parties to abrogate or eliminate from the set of legal rules or standards that 
govern their relationship.68 At least in the context of common-law agency, the stickiness of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty co-exists with the ability of principal and agent to agree to define the 
scope of the agent’s undertaking or the agency relationship to give the agent rights to take action 
that is adverse or otherwise detrimental to the principal’s interests. The ensembles of 
consignment and related agreements in the auction-house cases operate without regard to 
whether the agent has disclosed material facts to the principal or whether the actions that the 
agent may take are defined with much specificity. What controls—and unglues an otherwise 
sticky default rule—is the parties’ definition through agreement of the scope of the agent’s 
undertaking on behalf of the principal. This definition can be operative to modify or exclude 
duties of performance the agent would otherwise owe the principal, as in Reale, and, more 
controversially, to modify or exclude duties of loyalty by narrowing the scope of conduct to 
which duties of loyalty apply.                 
4  Consent to conduct otherwise in breach   
If an agent’s action is not outside the scope of the agency relationship and the duties the agent 
owes as a consequence of undertaking to act as an agent, the agent’s duties to the principal 
include fiduciary duties of loyalty. These include duties to refrain from acting as or on behalf of 
an adverse party69 and to refrain from competing with the principal and taking action on behalf 
                                                            
68Sometimes a default proves “sticky” not because the law imposes obstacles to its alteration but 
because the parties fail to alter the term when doing so would be in their best interests. For 
discussion of this explanation in connection with shareholders who become employees at will of 
companies they found, see Deborah A. DeMott, ‘Wilkes as an Employment Law Case’ (2011) 33  
W N Eng L Rev 497. 
69 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.03. 
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of the principal’s competitors.70 A principal may consent to action that would otherwise breach 
the agent’s duty of loyalty. To be effective, however, consent requires that the principal be in 
possession of material facts. Effective consent also requires specificity.71 In contrast, an agent’s 
duties of performance may be modified “as agreed” with the principal, that is, subject to the 
terms of the agent’s agreement with the principal.72 Finally, whether a principal has consented to 
an agent’s conduct is a question of historical fact, not hypothesis. It’s not a defense to conduct 
that breaches a fiduciary duty of loyalty that, had the agent asked for the principal’s consent, the 
principal would have given it,73 or that a reasonable person in the principal’s position would have 
consented to the agent’s action if asked. In particular, an agent who acts disloyally breaches the 
agent’s fiduciary duty although the principal benefits from the agent’s action. Were consent 
instead defined “hypothetically”—deemed present when the agent’s breach turns out to be 
beneficial for the principal—an agent might be tempted to act disloyally, in the hope that the 
                                                            
70Id § 8.04. An agent also breaches a fiduciary duty by acquiring a material benefit, without the 
principal’s consent, in connection with a transaction conducted on the principal’s behalf. See text 
accompanying n 32. 
71An analogous development in corporate law treats directors’ decisions to make awards of 
stock-based compensation to themselves as transactions in which the recipients are “interested” 
if the plan under which the awards are made contains no “meaningful limit” on directors’ 
exercise of discretion, although the corporation’s shareholders previously approved the plan. See 
Seinfeld v. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105 at * 12 (Del Ch June 29, 2012)(emphasis in original). That 
is, the fact that shareholders agreed ex ante to confer a carte blanche is “insufficient” to bring 
awards made under the plan within the scope of the business judgment rule, see id., which is 
especially capacious when applied to compensation-related decisions. As a consequence, the 
directors in Seinfeld bore the burden of establishing that the amounts they awarded themselves 
under the plan met a test of “entire fairness,” see id. Whether the holding is limited to 
stock-based compensation for directors or encompasses cash compensation that non-officer 
directors award themselves for board service is a question that Seinfeld does not address.  
72Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08 (duties of care, competence, and diligence). 
73See Sirko Harder, ‘Is a Defaulting Fiduciary Exculpated By the Principal’s Hypothetical 
Consent?’ (2008) 8 Oxford U Commonwealth L J 25, 27.   
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eventual outcome could then be proven advantageous to the principal. Shifting the definition of 
consent from historical fact to hypothesis would undermine the agent’s incentives to act loyally 
and would vitiate the principal’s entitlement to loyal action that’s created by the fiduciary 
character of an agency relationship. Likewise, shifting to a hypothetical “reasonable principal” 
standard would contravene the autonomy of the actual principal in a relationship in which the 
agent, by definition, acts as an extension of that principal in interactions with third parties. Along 
the same lines, it’s not a defense to common-law fraudulent misrepresentation that a victim 
would have entered into the transaction induced by fraud had the misrepresentation not been 
made, so long as the victim justifiably relied on the misrepresentation and her reliance was a 
substantial factor in determining her course of conduct resulting in loss.74 That is, the historical 
fact that the victim relied on a misrepresentation made by the fraud-feasor is determinative, just 
as is whether a principal in fact consented to the agent’s breach of loyalty.      
4.1  Agents for multiple parties 
In contrast with the consignment cases discussed in Section 2, this section focuses on recent 
cases in which an agent represented multiple sellers or buyers of the same type of asset, in which 
consent to an agent’s action that would otherwise breach the agent’s duties of loyalty may be a 
complex concept. How consent may be manifested varies with the context and, in some settings 
it may be justifiable to differentiate between individual agents (i.e. natural persons) and an 
entity-agent with which individuals are associated as employees or otherwise.  
 Courts acknowledge that consent may be implied in some circumstances, including ones 
                                                            
74See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 546 cmt. b (“It is not even necessary that he would not 
have acted or refrained from acting as he did unless he had relied on the misrepresentation....It is 
enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, 
in influencing his decision”); Harder (n 46) 27.  
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in which an industry’s basic business model involves the representation of more than one client 
whose interests may conflict.75 For example, it should be evident to a client of a securities 
brokerage firm that the broker’s other customers may be equally keen to buy (or sell) the same 
security within the same period of time. How the agent deals with excesses of buy- or sell-side 
orders may be subject to regulation, but the common law of agency does not itself limit a 
broker’s ability and right to accept competing orders from its customers, unless the broker (and 
the customers) so agree. Similarly, in Gentieu v. Tony Stone/Images Chicago, Inc., the agent was 
a photographic stock agency that represented many professional photographers, including the 
plaintiff, who agreed that the agency would serve as her exclusive licensing representative.76 The 
plaintiff alleged that the agency breached its fiduciary duty to her when it solicited and accepted 
images of babies—plaintiff’s photographic specialty—from other photographers. The court 
disagreed, noting that “the very nature of the stock photography business requires that the stock 
agency solicit images on the very same subject so that it can offer clients a menu of images to 
choose from.”77 Aware of how the stock agency operated, the plaintiff chose it as her exclusive 
licensing representative, impliedly consenting to the agency’s work on behalf of her competitors 
in the baby-photography genre. To be sure, the plaintiff and the agency could agree that it would 
represent only her work within this genre, but in return the agency may well demand an increase 
in its compensation to offset the narrowing of its image menu. 
 Transactions in residential real estate illustrate additional complexities of consent. Agents 
                                                            
75Specifics concerning the legal profession are beyond the scope of this Chapter.  
76255 F Supp 2d 838 (ND Ill 2003). 
77Id at 865 (emphasis in original). See also Sun Life Assur Co v. Sun Bancorp, 946 F Supp 2d 
182, 189 (D Mass 2012)(actions taken by stock transfer agent are not imputed to each company 
it deals with; any agency relationship is limited to transactions on behalf of particular company).  
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often represent multiple prospective buyers or sellers, as in Gentieu, suggesting that clients’ 
consent may be implied to conduct that’s otherwise problematic. Moreover, buyer-side 
representation in residential real-estate transactions is a relatively novel practice, at least in the 
United States. Thus, would the requisites of effective consent differ depending on whether an 
agent represents a prospective seller or a buyer? Separately, when principals interact with 
employees or associates of a brokerage firm, how intensely does the duty of loyalty apply to the 
firm as opposed to the individuals who interact with principals?  
 Consider first a case involving aggrieved prospective sellers. In Sonnenschein v. Douglas 
Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., the plaintiffs listed their condominium for sale with a real-estate 
broker on an exclusive basis.78 With the plaintiffs’ consent, the listing broker offered a 
co-brokerage arrangement to other brokerage firms under terms that assured the co-broker who 
facilitated a sale of half the commission due the listing broker. A salesperson employed by the 
defendant co-broker identified potential purchasers for plaintiffs’ apartment and plaintiff sent an 
unsigned sales contract to the potential purchasers’ lawyer. However, earlier the same month 
another sales associate of the same co-broker showed the prospective purchasers another 
apartment in the same building–one listed exclusively with the co-broker–which they preferred 
and subsequently purchased. The plaintiffs sued the co-broker, alleging that in breach of its 
fiduciary duty it induced the prospective purchasers to buy an apartment listed solely with it, 
allegedly generating a higher commission. The court held the defendant had no duty to refrain 
from showing other properties to a prospective purchaser even if its relationship to the plaintiffs 
amounted to one of agency.79 Specific agreement between the broker and the owner would be 
                                                            
7896 NY2d 369 (2001). 
79Accord, Coldwell Banker Commercial Group v. Camelback Office Park, 156 Ariz 226, 230 
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necessary to create an exclusive commitment by the broker that would require the broker to 
decline requests from prospective purchasers to see other properties listed with it. A default rule 
of exclusive commitment, the court argued, would frustrate both sellers and buyers by limiting 
their marketing and purchasing opportunities.  
 In Sonnenschein, as in Gentieu, a principal’s consent to conduct by an agent that may 
otherwise breach the agent’s fiduciary duties was implied on the basis of the principal’s 
participation in a market with established practices that are well-known and that serve the 
interests of most prospective sellers and buyers of the same type of asset. However, the scope of 
a principal’s consent is not boundless. The court notes in Sonnenschein that neither the plaintiffs 
nor their prospective purchasers considered themselves bound by a purchase contract for the 
plaintiffs’ apartment.80 The plaintiffs’ implied consent to the defendant’s representation of other 
principals with conflicting interests would not extend to another distinct breach of fiduciary duty, 
such as the defendant’s interference with performance of a contract between a third-party 
purchaser and the plaintiffs.81 As a species of consent (as opposed to “agreement”), implied 
consent is limited in scope to particular conduct or, at most, conduct that is substantially the 
same.82 A principal’s consent to one form of breach of fiduciary duty should not justify the 
agent’s commission of another form of breach. Again, a reference to basic tort-law principles is 
informative. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts observes, “consent to a fight with fists is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(1988); McEvoy v. Ginsberg, 345 Mass 733 (1963). 
8096 NY2d at 376-77. 
81On tortious interference with contract, see Restatement (Second of Torts) § 766 (1979). 
82Id. § 892A(2)(b). 
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consent to an act of a very different character, such as biting off a finger ....”83 Consent in this 
context does not, in short, operate at a high level of generality.      
  Buyer-side representation in the real-estate context also occurs in a setting in which 
prospective buyers are well aware that they may compete with others interested in the same 
property. In Rivkin v. Century 21 Teran Realty LLC, the court applied the reasoning in 
Sonnenschein to prospective buyers of property who are represented by brokers.84 Unless the 
principal and a brokerage firm agree otherwise, the firm does not breach its fiduciary duty to the 
principal when individual associates of the firm make offers to purchase property on which the 
principal has bid, acting on behalf of other prospective buyer-side clients. Nor is the firm obliged 
to assure that its associates and affiliates do not facilitate offers by prospective purchasers that 
may compete with the principal’s, unless the firm and the principal specifically so agree.  
 Thus, Rivkin appears to set the default rule at the same point as does Sonnenschein. 
However, the apparent parallelism is misleading because Rivkin also differentiates the default 
rule applicable to an individual agent from that applicable to the brokerage firm with which the 
individual is associated. An individual agent who represents multiple prospective buyers who bid 
on the same property breaches the agent’s fiduciary duty to each unless each the agent makes 
disclosure to and obtains the consent of each principal.85 Why the difference? As the court 
explains, “[a]n individual buyer’s agent acting on behalf of multiple clients bidding on the same 
property cannot negotiate an optimal purchase price for all of them. The buyers’ interests conflict 
                                                            
83Id. cmt. c.  
8410 NY3d 344 (2008). 
85Id at 357. 
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....”86  
 To be sure, the would-be buyers’ interests would also conflict when individual agents 
associated with the same brokerage firm submit offers to purchase the same property on behalf 
of their separate clients, but the likelihood that the firm-level conflict will impair loyal 
representation at the individual-agent level is more attenuated. For one thing, if an individual 
agent’s client does not succeed in purchasing property, the agent receives no commission. Of 
course, the same distinction between disloyalty at the level of individual agents as opposed to 
disloyalty at the level of the firm with which the individuals are associated is not universally 
applicable. For example, the conflict created by an individual lawyer’s representation of a client 
may be imputed to the lawyer’s firm and make improper its representation of another client with 
an adverse interest.87  
   These distinctions have implications for theoretical treatments of fiduciary duties as 
default rules. Although the cases stem from common situations in which an agent’s actions are 
within the scope of the agent’s representative role, consent by the principal to action that 
otherwise would breach the agent’s fiduciary duty is both nuanced and context-dependent.  
Consent, which may be implied in some circumstances, is operative only within its scope and 
does not extend or transfer from a consented-to breach of fiduciary duty to another distinct 
breach, lurking in the background in a fashion comparable to the principal’s advance consent 
through the conferral of authority.88 Moreover, as Rivkin illustrates, how courts set the default 
rule turns on the risks implicit in the situation. At the individual-agent level, unless a prospective 
                                                            
86Id at 356. 
87See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 123 (2000). 
88On “lurking” consent, see text accompanying n 20. 
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buyer gives particularized consent and has received disclosure concerning the agent’s 
representation of a competing bidder, the agent’s representation of multiple competing principals 
breaches the agent’s fiduciary duties because the risk of compromised loyalty is so evident. On 
the firm level, default rules contemplate a well-known practice of multiple representations of 
principals by brokerage firms with no likely reason necessarily to favor one principal over 
another.  
4.2   Terminal agreements: releases of claims when an agency relationship is at an end  
Temporal limits also define the scope of the duties an agent owes a principal. In particular, 
following the end of a relationship of agency, the (now-former) agent is free to deal with the 
(now-former) principal at arms-length unless some basis other than agency imposes fiduciary 
duties on the former agent. Less straightforwardly, toward the formal conclusion of an agency 
relationship, the soon-to-be former agent and principal may have dealings or enter into 
agreements that may be disadvantageous to the principal. When the principal challenges their 
terms, post-relationship, as breaches of the agent’s fiduciary duty, the agent’s defense is often 
that the relationship had deteriorated to the point that the parties dealt as adversaries, which 
obviated any fiduciary duty that the agent might have otherwise owed the principal. Whether the 
agent’s argument is plausible necessarily turns on specific facts about the parties and their 
relationship, including the principal’s degree of sophistication. In particular, if the principal 
enters into an agreement that releases claims against the agent stemming from the agent’s prior 
conduct, to the extent the release concerns claims of breach then unknown to the principal it is 
ineffective if an agency relationship still links the parties; an agent’s duties of disclosure 
encompass all material information, including prior conduct by the agent breaching the agent’s 
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duties to the principal.89 Although it is valuable to enable parties to bring finality to a 
relationship, including through releases of claims they may assert against each other,90 it is 
important that the perception of adversarial dealings be mutual.91  
5  Conclusion: agreement and consent 
As this Chapter demonstrates, within a relationship of common-law agency, the relative 
“stickiness” of fiduciary duty as a default rule varies. Agency doctrine involves two different 
kinds of altering rules, that is, necessary and sufficient conditions to vary a default rule.92 
Through agreement defining the scope of an agent’s undertaking or representative role on behalf 
of the principal, the parties may exclude actions the agent may take from the scope of the 
undertaking and the agent’s fiduciary duties. Separately, through consent, a principal may relieve 
an agent of liability for conduct that would otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. 
                                                            
89See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc v. Cheng, 901 F2d 1124 (DC Cir 1990) 
(broker’s duties of disclosure to client encompassed duty to disclose that client had right to reject 
unauthorized purchases made by broker). 
90Several recent cases adopt this justification when a release of claims, including those grounded 
in fraud, accompanies the purchase of an equity interest by one owner from another. See Barr v. 
Dyke, 49 A3d 1280 (Me 2012); Centro Empresarial Cempresa SA v. América Móvil, SAB de CV, 
952 NE2d 995 (NY 2011). Both Barr and Centro Empresarial emphasize the parties’s 
sophistication and demonstrable wariness of each other.  
91See Finn v. Prudential-Bache Secs, Inc, 821 F2d 581, 588 (11th Cir 1987)(Brown, J, 
dissenting)(record on appeal “does not, as required, demonstrate beyond genuine factual 
controversy at what point [clients] should have known to stop treating [brokerage firm] as their 
trusted financial advisor”). In Finn, the inexperienced clients’ broker likely defrauded them; the 
broker’s employer demanded a release that encompassed all claims, including fraud, as an 
alternative to immediate liquidation of the clients’ account, which the broker had indebted by 
over $500,000. The majority opinion emphasized that the clients were represented at the point of 
the release by counsel, who later wrote a memo to himself stating he told his clients they 
“probably” had a securities fraud claim against the firm. Id at 586. The dissent discredits the 
lawyer’s statement as “not made as an historical record of the events” but as a predictable result 
of an anticipated malpractice claim. Id at 589.    
92For this terminology, see Ian Ayres, ‘Menus Matter’ (2006)73 U Chi L Rev 3, 6. 
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Consent requires disclosure by the agent to the principal of material facts, plus a manifestation 
by the principal of willingness that particular conduct occur. Consent thus resembles the 
application of a fact-specific and multi-variable standard and not the application of a crystalline 
rule with requisites that can be determined in advance with precision.93  
 Clarity about the distinct roles of agreement and consent has both theoretical and 
practical value. In the view of the leading English authority on agency law, “[a] too casual failure 
to recognize the requirements of a fiduciary position, and sometimes a short-sighted assumption 
that all relevant duties are prescribed in a contract, can be and has been responsible for serious 
misbehaviour in the financial markets and elsewhere, as is shown by many litigated cases in the 
last quarter-century.”94 In this respect, the relevant formulations in the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency were less than optimally clear. On the one hand, language introducing the specific 
sections detailing an agent’s duties acknowledged that although an agency relationship 
“normally involves a contract, it is a special kind of contract, since an agent is not merely a 
promisor or a promisee but is also a fiduciary.”95 On the other hand, most of the specific sections 
articulating an agent’s duties of loyalty began “[u]nless otherwise agreed ....”96 Although the 
                                                            
93See McDonnell, (n 7) (characterizing duty of loyalty in corporate law as an instance of a 
“tailored altering rule,” customized in application to specific factual circumstances as understood 
by the court).   
94 Francis MB Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006)  
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95Restatement (Second of Agency), Introductory Note to Ch. 13, at 171. The passage continues: 
“Even specific agreements, however, must be interpreted in light of the principles which are 
applicable to the relation of principal and agent.” 
96See id §§ 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397 & 398. The one exception is section 
392, applicable to an agent who is known to two principals to act for both of them in a 
transaction between them. Section 392 imposes a duty on the agent to act with fairness to each 
principal and to disclose to each all facts reasonably believed material to the principal, unless a 
 -34- 
repetition of this phrase, coupled with Restatement (Second)’s silence about its meaning, carried 
the potential for confusion,97 most courts examined agreements between principal and agent 
closely, placing the burden on the agent to show indicia of consent by the principal to actions 
within the scope of the agent’s representative role that would otherwise contravene the agent’s 
duties of loyalty.98 Restatement (Third) of Agency, in contrast, explicitly requires consent by the 
principal to instances of disloyal conduct within the scope of the agent’s role.99 In broad outline, 
its treatment of attempts to alter an agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty corresponds to the pattern 
identified in the theoretical literature discussed in this paper.    
 The distinction between agreement and consent has intriguing parallels elsewhere in 
basic agency doctrine. When a principal confers authority on an agent (or reasonably appears to a 
third party to have done so), the principal is bound by actions the agent takes within the scope of 
the agent’s actual or apparent authority even though the principal may regret what the agent has 
done when the principal learns of it; as discussed above, authority constitutes a form of “lurking” 
or background consent. For example, if the owner of a painting consigns it to an auction house 
for sale with a low reserve price, the consignor is bound by a sale at or above that price although 
the consignor comes to believe she set the reserve too low. The creation of actual or apparent 
authority in an agent, like an agreement, is effective to bind the principal when the agent acts 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
principal has manifested that he knows such facts or does not wish to know them. 
97For a recent example, see Greenwood, 880 F Supp at 194 (“[t]he ‘unless otherwise agreed’ 
language appears throughout the Restatement and is clearly meant to allow parties to modify by 
contract the common law agency principles that would govern their agreement in the absence of 
an agreement.”). 
98See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06, Reporter’s Notes. 
99Id. § 8.06. 
 -35- 
consistently with it, although the terms of the authority are stated in general terms, for example 
by a consignment with no minimum reserve price. In contrast, when an agent acts without actual 
or apparent authority to bind the principal, the principal may become bound—as if the agent had 
acted with actual authority—by ratifying what the agent has done. Like effective consent, 
ratification requires specificity because the principal must know what the agent has done.100 And 
ratification, like effective consent, is a matter of historical fact, not hypothesis. A principal 
ratifies only through action manifesting assent to be bound by the agent’s action. Showing that 
the principal in fact benefitted through the agent’s conduct establishes ratification only when the 
principal knew the material facts and had no independent right to the benefit; under these 
circumstances, the principal’s failure to repudiate the benefit (and the agent’s act that generated 
the benefit) establishes consent.101  
 Finally, the vocabulary of default rules might be applied to dimensions of common-law 
agency doctrine apart from fiduciary duty. The starting default rule—that only a person’s own 
actions affect that person’s legal position—can be changed through the consensual creation of a 
relationship of agency with another person. Agency law’s baseline rule, reflecting the agent’s 
position as the principal’s representative, is that the principal is bound only when the agent acts 
consistently with manifestations of assent to the agent through which the principal furnishes 
instructions or other indications of the scope of limit of the agent’s representative status. A 
corollary doctrine—apparent authority—holds the principal when the principal’s actions lead 
third parties reasonably to believe that the agent acts as the principal’s representative. The 
baseline rule and its corollary, which limit the extent to which the agent’s actions bind the 
                                                            
100 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.06. 
101Id § 4.01 cmt f. 
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principal to the scope of the agent’s actual or apparent authority, operate as “sticky” defaults in 
much the same fashion as does the fiduciary duty of loyalty. When an agent steps outside the 
bounds of actual or apparent authority, only ratification with knowledge of the material facts 
binds the principal. Ratification, like consent to a breach of fiduciary duty, thus requires 
specificity. Moreover, like consent, whether an act that effects ratification has occurred is a 
question of historical fact, not hypothesis. Even when the factual basis for showing ratification is 
a principal’s retention of a benefit generated by the agent’s unauthorized act, it’s requisite that 
the principal have known the material facts, not that the unaware principal would have ratified 
the act had the principal known the facts.               
                
          
    
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
